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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent focus on patents as a hindrance to stem cell research may 
turn out to be a red herring. The real culprits are material transfer agree-
ments (MTAs), which govern the transfer of cell lines and other biological 
materials.1 The MTA’s primary purpose in life sciences research is to set 
contractual rights and obligations between parties where one party trans-
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 1. See generally John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the 
Bench: Patents and Material Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002 (2005) [hereinafter View from the 
Bench]; John P. Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, Presentation at Madrid 
CSIC/OECD/OEPM Conference on Research Use of Patented Inventions: Roadblocks to 
Accessing Biomedical Research Tools (May 18-19, 2006), http://www.oecd.org/-
dataoecd/40/12/36816897.pdf [hereinafter Walsh, Roadblocks]. 
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fers biological materials to the other.2 For example, MTAs often focus on 
the physical handling, use, and distribution of the materials by the recipi-
ent, ensuring that the recipient complies with regulations for research in-
volving humans or animals.3 Although these interests are legitimate, evi-
dence indicates that owners of important biological research materials use 
their non-patent property rights to require recipient consent to arguably 
onerous MTAs, which include provisions governing intellectual property 
rights (IPR). When an intended recipient’s institution refuses to sign the 
MTA, the researcher cannot access the biological materials, and in some 
cases cannot pursue her research. 
One must understand the interaction between physical property rights 
and IPR in MTAs to achieve a proper balance among (1) rewarding inno-
vators, (2) reducing obstacles to next generation innovators, and (3) ensur-
ing that the public receives benefits in exchange for public research fund-
ing. Part II works through the details of this interaction by placing life sci-
ences MTAs in the context of a broader technology distribution model that 
I call the “lease-license model.” Part III examines Wisconsin Alumni Re-
search Foundation’s (WARF) and WiCell Research Institute’s (WiCell) 
current dominant control of the stem cell research environment as a case 
study in the power of MTAs to control life sciences research. Part III also 
discusses some of the important counterbalancing government rights that 
can be used to provide for relatively unfettered research. Part IV subse-
quently analyzes the impact that the current WARF/WiCell legal position 
will have on research funded by the California Institute for Regenerative 
Medicine (CIRM). In conclusion, Part V suggests legal strategies for mov-
ing beyond the current WARF/WiCell controlled research environment.  
II. MATERIAL TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE LEASE-
LICENSE TECHNOLOGY DISTRIBUTION MODEL 
Confusion surrounds MTAs because they frequently convey both 
physical property rights and IPR licenses.4 One must distinguish the 
physical property rights from whatever IPR the MTA may convey. In 
some MTAs, the transferor makes explicitly clear that the recipient may 
need IPR licenses from third parties to use the transferred biological mate-
                                                                                                                         
 2. See Uniform Biological Material Transfer Agreement: Discussion of Public 
Comments Received; Publication of the Final Format of the Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 
12,771, 12,771 (Mar. 8, 1995) [hereinafter UBMTA]. 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Memorandum of Understanding between WiCell Research Institute, Inc. 
and Public Health Service, (Sept. 5, 2001), http://stemcells.nih.gov/staticresources/-
research/registry/MTAs/Wicell_MOU.pdf [hereinafter WiCell MOU]. 
2006] USE OF MTAS TO CONTROL COMMERCIALIZATION 1019 
rials for the recipient’s specific research purposes.5 Of course, one would 
assume that the transferor at least implies that the delivery of the biologi-
cal materials has not violated any IP rights. 
Interestingly, MTAs usually do not convey ownership of the biological 
materials they transfer; rather, they typically lease those materials.6 I re-
frain from using the term “license” here because it will only add to the 
confusion between the physical property rights grant and any IPR licenses 
that are included in the MTA. However, my sense is that most institutions 
refer to the legal conveyances of permission to use the biological materials 
qua physical property as well as qua IP as “licenses.” This dual “lease-
license” model is hardly unique to life sciences MTAs—it is also the un-
derlying model for much of the software industry,7 the original Bell tele-
phone service,8 commercial test prep materials,9 musical scores made 
available for school performances,10 many of the original cable television 
services,11 and even the recent controversial practice of “bag tags” in the 
seed and agricultural biotechnology industries.12 Many technology or ser-
vice providers who use the lease-license model do not even require or ex-
pect the return of the physical materials. The recipient may destroy the 
materials or retain them indefinitely. Restrictions apply, though, to further 
transfers by the recipient. Thus, few software vendors require that pur-
                                                                                                                         
 5. See American Type Culture Collection, Material Transfer Agreement and Order, 
http://www.atcc.org/documents/mta/mta.cfm (last visited Sept. 8, 2003) [hereinafter 
American Type MTA]. 
 6. See WiCell MOU, supra note 4; American Type MTA, supra note 5. 
 7. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Robert Gomulkiewicz & Danielle Conway-Jones, In-
tellectual Property, Software, and Information: Licensing Law and Practice (forthcoming 
2006). 
 8. See Bell System Memorial: Bell System Property—Not For Sale, http://www.-
bellsystemmemorial.com/bell_system_property.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006) [herein-
after Bell Property].  
 9. See, e.g., Bar/Bri Patent Bar Review, Bar/Bri Patent Bar Review Enrollment 
Form, http://www.patentbarbri.com/download/pdf/enrollment01.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 
2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Music Theater International, FAQ: How to License a Musical, http://-
www.mtishows.com/faq_licensing.asp (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).  
 11. See, e.g., Sanjay Talwani, Industries Battling for the Future of Set-Top Boxes, 
TVTECHNOLOGY.COM, Nov. 14, 2001, http://www.tvtechnology.com/features/news/n-
settops1.shtml; David Connell, Waiting for Set-Tops: Making Set-Top Boxes Available 
for Purchase at Retail is Not as Simple as it Sounds – Broadband Content, CABLE-
WORLD, Nov. 27, 2000, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0DIZ/-
is_48_12/ai_80191763; National Cable and Telecommunications Association, Cable In-
dustry Announces Retail Set-Top Initiative, http://www.ncta.com/ContentView.aspx?-
hidenavlink=true&type=reltyp1&contentId=163 (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
 12. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, 363 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004).  
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chasers return the CD-ROMs containing the software. Test prep services 
sometimes require a deposit on materials, which they refund when the user 
returns the materials to the company. If the consumer fails to return the 
materials, he simply forfeits the deposit, though the transfer restrictions 
continue to bind him. Seeds transferred under bag tag licenses are the ul-
timate example of this practice in that they are, of course, destroyed 
through the very use for which they were leased-licensed to the farmer.13  
Like their counterparts in other industries, many distributors of bio-
logical materials under MTAs do not require the materials to be returned. 
This begs the central question of why transferors lease them out rather 
than sell them. Presumably, one could charge a higher upfront payment for 
an outright sale than for a lease. Other common lease situations such as 
auto leases or real estate rentals are likely premised on potentially greater 
economic returns over time through the continued payments by the les-
see/tenant. However, in most of the lease-license models given above, in-
cluding biological MTAs, ongoing payments are rarely required.14 Instead, 
transferors may well be seeking other important legal and business advan-
tages that are forfeited in a sale model. These advantages generally fall 
into three categories: (1) control of IP rights/ownership; (2) elimination, or 
at least limitation, of potential liability to third parties who might other-
wise obtain the materials from the original recipient; and (3) unlocking 
extra value for the distributor and its clients through business models that 
focus on more than just sales of goods. The lease-license model also gives 
extra business and negotiation leverage to the transferor, since the recipi-
ent bears the risk that certain triggering events set out in the contract will 
terminate the IP license and require the return of all materials, sometimes 
including derivative materials created by the recipient. 
The first category of legal and business advantages of the lease-license 
model—IPR control—is likely the most important to transferors of mate-
rials. The inclusion of strong IPR language in the lease-license agree-
ment—e.g., MTA or end-user license agreement—often causes the public 
and even the parties to conflate the physical property lease rights and the 
IPR. Essentially, the transfer agreement often sets up the two strands of 
rights—physical and IP, or tangible and intangible—to reinforce one an-
other. A version of this reinforcement strategy is examined in more detail 
                                                                                                                         
 13. This, however, does lead directly to the litigated controversy in bag tag license 
situations whereby the farmer attempts to (re)use the next generation seeds, if any, which 
is generally prohibited under bag tag licenses. See, e.g., id. 
 14. Note, however, that the original Bell telephone service and some bag tag li-
censes are the exceptions in that ongoing payments are/were required for continued use 
or service. 
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below as the focus of this Article: the stem cell ownership rights exercised 
by WARF and its affiliate WiCell.15 At the abstract level, this reinforce-
ment strategy is best explained by thinking of it first as the physical prop-
erty lease reinforcing, or even enhancing, the IP license. If the physical 
property embodying or carrying the IP is sold outright, the transfer argua-
bly invokes first sale/exhaustion doctrines16 allowing the recipient to 
transfer, experiment with, disassemble, repair, or modify the physical 
property. Where the recipient later transfers the property, the original 
transferor/owner risks that an unknown third party recipient will use the 
property outside the scope of the original IP license, including to generate 
unlawful further copies. The original recipient could do these things as 
well, but at least the transferor knows, to some extent, with whom it dealt. 
Importantly, the lease-license model cuts off the first sale/exhaustion doc-
trines for the physical property transferred, thus allowing the transferor to 
impose a wider range of use restrictions on the recipient.17 Critical types 
of desired use restrictions (for the transferor) include prohibitions on re-
verse engineering—to reduce the risk of loss of trade secrets—and prohi-
bitions or limitations on transfer of the physical property.18 Less critical, 
but frequently seen, are use restrictions including prohibitions on uses that 
might otherwise fall within fair use or research use exemptions in copy-
right and patent law, respectively. The ultimate goal, then, is to enhance 
                                                                                                                         
 15. See infra Parts III & IV. 
 16. The “first sale” doctrine in copyright law gives purchasers of lawful copies of a 
copyrighted work the rights to sell or otherwise transfer the copy, which would otherwise 
be controlled by the copyright owner under her distribution right established in the Copy-
right Act. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2000); see also PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPY-
RIGHT § 1.4.3 (2nd ed. 2002). The doctrine of “patent exhaustion” allows purchasers of 
objects embodying issued patent claims to similarly sell or transfer the object, as well as 
to repair the object, even if any of these activities would otherwise infringe the patent 
owner’s exclusive rights to make, use, sell, or import the patented invention or objects 
embodying the patented invention. See Mallinkrodt v. Medi-Part, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). However, one major patent law casebook questions the appropriateness 
of the term “patent exhaustion” and argues that the doctrine should be called “first sale” 
in the context of patents. See DONALD CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 1136-
38 (3d ed. 2004).  
 17. Note that there can be conditioned sales, but the use restrictions that can be en-
forced in that model may be more limited than those that can be enforced in the lease-
license model. See, e.g., Mallinkrodt, 976 F.2d 700. Another way to look at this is that the 
lease-license model allows the transferor to prohibit all of the user rights that might come 
along with first sale or exhaustion because there is no sale to trigger those doctrines. The 
conditioned sale model, by contrast, still triggers those doctrines. 
 18. Note that while patents and copyright still seem to dominate discussion of tech-
nology and IP transfers, trade secret protection plays a far larger role in actual practice 
than generally considered in the literature. 
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the IPR owner’s control of the technology through state contract law. The 
potential conflict between state contract law and federal IPR law in appli-
cations such as the lease-license model has increasingly attracted the atten-
tion of commentators.19 
From the opposite direction, the IP, and licenses thereunder, also rein-
force claims or leverage with regard to physical property. This is particu-
larly important where others could fairly easily replicate the biological 
materials without access to the original owner’s materials. The doctrines 
of misuse, especially patent misuse,20 or prohibitions on some tying ar-
rangements under antitrust law21 traditionally limited this leverage. Under 
earlier interpretations of both the patent misuse doctrine and the prohibi-
tion on improper tying arrangements under antitrust law, patent owners 
were generally not allowed to use their patents to force others to buy their 
version of non-patented staple goods, or perhaps even non-patented non-
staple goods.22 The 1952 Patent Act, through Sections 271(c)-(d), re-
stricted patent misuse to those cases where the patentee conditions patent 
licenses, or sales of patented goods, on the purchase of staple goods from 
the patentee. These provisions essentially exempt the tying of non-staple 
goods that are essential to the practice of the patent from the definition of 
patent misuse.23 In 1988, Congress amended Section 271(d) of the Patent 
Act to restrict misuse to cases involving non-patented staple goods where 
the patentee had market power in the patent or patented goods.24 Courts 
generally presumed that the patent itself gave the patentee market power 
for the patent or patented goods.25 Thus, courts frequently found patentees 
who tied licenses or patented goods to staple goods to have engaged in 
patent misuse, prohibiting them from enforcing their patent until the mis-
use was discontinued.26 Accordingly, firms using the lease-license model 
were effectively restricted from forcing customers to purchase staple 
                                                                                                                         
 19. See, e.g., Daniel Laster, The Secret is Out: Patent Law Preempts Mass Market 
License Terms Barring Reverse Engineering for Interoperability Purposes, 58 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 621 (forthcoming 2006). 
 20. See, e.g., CHISUM, supra note 16, at 1084-1104. 
 21. See Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281, 1284-88 
(2006).  
 22. See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 187-215 (discuss-
ing development of judicial doctrines of patent misuse and contributory infringement 
with respect to both staple and non-staple goods, and the legislative history of Section 
271 of the 1952 Patent Act which substantially limited the extent of the patent misuse 
doctrine); see also Illinois Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1284-90.  
 23. Illinois Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1290. 
 24. Id. at 1290-91; CHISUM, supra note 16, at 1104. 
 25. Illinois Tool, 126 S. Ct. at 1290. 
 26. Id. at 1288-90; CHISUM, supra note 16, at 1084-85, 1103-04. 
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goods that fell outside the claims of their patents—say, computer mouse 
pads along with patented software or hardware. However, the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc.27 
abrogates the presumption of market power conferred upon a patent owner 
by the patent grant. Consequently, infringement defendants who want to 
assert patent misuse or antitrust law as a defense must demonstrate actual 
market power. Accordingly, patent owners may now be able to impose a 
wider range of license or use restrictions on potential licensees and pur-
chasers. Yet, even under the earlier interpretations of law, they were al-
most certainly permitted to specify that they would only grant licenses as a 
package deal with leases, rentals, or sales of physical embodiments of the 
patents that the patent owner produced. At the same time, they could bun-
dle other, possibly less desirable, patent licenses together with the sought 
after licenses, so long as they plausibly asserted that the entire package 
cost no more than the stand alone desired license would have cost.28  
The strategy of refusing to grant IPR licenses except as part of prod-
ucts or services developed and marketed by the IPR owner itself is essen-
tially that of the closed technologist, such as Apple Computer.29 The 
closed technologist does not license others to bring versions of the tech-
nology to the marketplace, but rather directly manufactures, or has others 
manufacture for its distribution, all of the permitted saleable versions of its 
products. By contrast, open technologists license out their patents for 
manufacture and distribution of patented articles, sometimes to companies 
in some degree of competition with the pioneer technologist. IBM used 
this model to sell its PC platform.30 An early example of a closed tech-
nologist company exerting tight control of IPR and embodying products 
was that of the original Bell telephone system. Bell highly restricted hard-
ware choices for phone service customers.31 Affiliates such as Western 
Electric supplied the approved hardware to Bell customers,32 and the use 
of unapproved telephones or other hardware on the Bell phone lines vio-
lated the service contract.33 Of course, the government broke up the Bell 
                                                                                                                         
 27. 126 S. Ct. 1281. 
 28. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 133-40 
(1969). 
 29. For a history of Apple Computer and its decisions to neither license out its 
hardware or software nor produce other parties’ technologies as clones, see OWEN W. 
LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL: THE REAL STORY OF APPLE COMPUTER, INC. 47 
(1999). 
 30. This platform was recently sold off to Lenovo. 
 31. See Bell Property, supra note 8. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
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system, as part of the original AT&T, as a monopoly in violation of fed-
eral antitrust laws in 1984.34 
Discussion of the Bell system highlights how the sometimes under-
rated distinction between goods and services—as legal categories—can 
play a critical role in determining rights between parties. So far this Arti-
cle has addressed either sales of goods—covered by Article 2 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC)—or lease-license hybrids—covered by a 
combination of Article 2A of the UCC (for the lease portion) and the rele-
vant IP law (for the licenses).35 One could characterize the original Bell 
system as a service that provided hardware. Today, what is commonly re-
ferred to as “phone service,” that is, the live connection transmitted by a 
phone line, differs from the historical meaning of the term. Old advertise-
ments for telephone service and the explanatory materials AT&T provided 
during the break-up explain the difference between its phone service and 
the package customers could expect from other providers or from AT&T 
where customers used their own telephones and hardware. It is clear 
AT&T felt it was providing the phones, wires, maintenance, and even 
phone books as part of the original service.36 Though AT&T’s old true 
phone service is gone, hardware based services are still installed in homes 
to this day in the form of security systems and some cable and satellite 
television services. Since the technologist provides a service rather than 
either a sale of goods or a lease-license, neither the UCC nor IP laws seem 
to directly apply. Instead, common law rules regarding the provision of 
                                                                                                                         
 34. See, e.g., Bell System Memorial: AT&T Divestiture, http://www.bellsystem-
memorial.com/att_divestiture.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter Bell Divesti-
ture]. The eventual fate of the Bell System and AT&T raises the related issue that aggres-
sive technologists who leverage their physical and intellectual property off each other too 
strongly may find themselves targets of antitrust investigations by the Justice Department 
or Federal Trade Commission. Ultimately, of course, something close to the original 
AT&T has recently risen phoenix-like from the long smoldering ashes of “Ma Bell” and 
the “Baby Bells;” the former SBC Communications, itself a product of mergers of former 
Baby Bells, and the remaining long distance provider shell of the AT&T corporation, 
merged to form the “new” at&t. See at&t, AT&T Fact Sheet: Company Overview: Cor-
porate History, http://att.sbc.com/gen/investor-relations?pid=5711 (last visited Aug. 30, 
2006). Marketing and PR gurus can speculate as to the choice of lower case letters for the 
acronym—maybe the new at&t is supposed to be more warm and fuzzy or approachable 
than the perhaps imposing former “AT&T” in capital letters. 
 35. For a fuller discussion of the relationships among IPR licensing, sales of goods 
rules in the UCC, and leases under the UCC in technology distribution models, see 
Nguyen, Gomulkiewicz & Conway-Jones, supra note 7.  
 36. See generally Bell System Memorial: Bell System Advertisements, http://www.-
bellsystemmemorial.com/bellsystem_ads.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006); Bell Divesti-
ture, supra note 34; Bell Property, supra note 8. 
2006] USE OF MTAS TO CONTROL COMMERCIALIZATION 1025 
personal or professional services apply, except where specifically regu-
lated otherwise.37 This common law realm may seem to be even more fa-
vorable to the technologist’s bid to tightly control its platform technolo-
gies.38 In fact, a trend in the software industry has followed the model of 
application service providers (ASPs), who host software applications on 
websites that customers can access to use the software.39 In this relatively 
recent model, the product delivered is purely a service. The provider nei-
ther sells nor leases any goods to the customer. Thus, the technology-as-
service model may yet persist some time longer. Based on a patented 
technology or platform, this service model increasingly concerns health 
care professionals with regard to exclusive control of critical diagnostic 
procedures. For example, Myriad Genetics, Inc. exclusively provides 
BRCA-1 and BRCA-240 breast cancer gene diagnostic test services, and 
Athena Diagnostics, Inc. exclusively provides certain genetic diagnostic 
test services for Alzheimer’s disease and Spinocerebellar Ataxia Type 1 
(SCA1) disease.41 Because other biological materials governed by MTAs 
already remain the property of the supplier, it would not be a very large 
step for commercial suppliers to structure distributions of biological mate-
rials as a service, rather than to use the lease-license model. If major stem 
cell line suppliers like WiCell moved in this direction, it would further 
complicate the research environment.  
In the life sciences, the transfer of biological materials among re-
searchers has relied on the lease-license model as much because of the 
second category of legal and business advantages to transferors—limiting 
third party access and hence potential liability—as for the IPR control 
category.42 Clearly, regulation is needed for the downstream distribution 
                                                                                                                         
 37. See Nguyen, Gomulkiewicz & Conway-Jones, supra note 7.  
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. 
 40. See National Institutes of Health, Division of Intramural Research, Questions 
and Answers, BRCA1 and BRCA2, http://www.genome.gov/DIR/GMBB/BRCA/-
questions.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
 41. See, e.g., Debra G.B. Leonard, Gene Patents: A Physician’s Perspective, Presen-
tation at the National Academies’ Intellectual Property in Genomic and Protein Research 
and Innovation Project, http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/Leonard_presentation_-
October_proteomics.ppt (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). For more information on this Pro-
ject, see National Academies, Intellectual Property in Genomic and Protein Research and 
Innovation Project, http://www7.nationalacademies.org/step/STEP_Projects_Proteomics.-
html (last visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
 42. Biological material transfers are not considered a service in most cases because 
the transferor does not retain control over the materials transferred to the recipient and 
plays no role in producing the outcome that the recipient seeks to produce in the lab. In 
the technology service examples discussed above, the technology owners still largely 
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of materials that have the potential to be biohazards if not handled prop-
erly. Nonetheless, in part because of the heightened risk associated with 
potential third party liability for biohazard materials, the negotiation of 
MTAs has become a difficult and time-consuming process, many times 
ending with no deal and no materials for the prospective recipient re-
searcher.43 While this may just be a reality that parties have to live with, a 
number of researchers and institutions in the field believe the real obstacle 
lies in the lack of a standard form of MTA.44 In other industries that use 
the lease-license distribution model, standard forms—such as end-user 
license agreements in software—have emerged from the parties them-
selves.45 This had not happened in the life sciences.46 Consequently, the 
Public Health Service (PHS), acting through the National Institutes of 
Health (NIH), in conjunction with the Association of University Technol-
ogy Managers (AUTM) and representatives of universities, law firms, and 
industry, launched an initiative to create a uniform biological MTA (the 
UBMTA) in the 1990s.47 
The final model UBMTA, issued in 1995,48 consists of a Master 
Agreement to be adopted by institutions who voluntarily became signato-
ries to the UBMTA initiative, and a shorter Implementing Letter form to 
be used by and between signatory institutions to record specific biological 
material transfers.49 Although 292 research institutions have signed onto 
                                                                                                                         
controlled and maintained the system installed in the home or business. The customer had 
the relatively narrow—although critical in terms of the ultimate value of the service to the 
customer—task of, say, dialing a phone number. Of course, in the earliest days of phone 
service the customer merely picked up the receiver, “rang” for the operator, and re-
quested that a call was placed by the service provider itself. 
 43. See View from the Bench, supra note 1; Walsh, Roadblocks, supra note 1. 
 44. See UBMTA, supra note 2, at 12771.  
 45. See Nguyen, Gomulkiewicz & Conway-Jones, supra note 7. 
 46. Whereas other industries that have adopted lease-license models have firms pro-
viding one-to-many products, in the life sciences research field the owners of biological 
materials are not usually involved in one-to-many distributions. Rather, in many cases 
there may only be one or a handful of distributions of the materials. Further, outside of 
commercial firms like the American Type Culture Center (ATCC), few if any of the non-
commercial research entities that own useful biological materials, such as universities, 
make a business out of marketing and distributing those materials. Accordingly, where it 
might be cost effective for firms in one-to-many commercial distribution models such as 
the software industry to develop and deploy, and customers to accept, mass market li-
censes that may cost a good deal in upfront legal fees, this kind of approach is harder to 
justify in the one-to-one or one-to-few world of biological MTAs. 
 47. See UBMTA, supra note 2, at 12771. 
 48. Id. 
 49. See AUTM, Resources, http://www.autm.net/aboutTT/aboutTT_umbta.cfm (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2006). 
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the UBMTA initiative to date,50 it does not seem to have had a broad 
streamlining effect on biological material transfers in the research com-
munity. Part of this may be because the initiative was directed only to-
wards the public and non-profit sectors, although PHS suggested that for-
profit organizations might “choose to adopt this agreement as well.”51 Yet, 
even in the recommended target signatory audience of public and non-
profit organizations, PHS did not require organizations to sign the Master 
UBMTA Agreement as a condition of further PHS funding.52 Further, 
even among signatories, the UBMTA “would not be mandatory” so that 
organizations could “retain the option to handle specific material with un-
usual commercial or research value on a customized basis.”53 Accord-
ingly, the allowance of too many exceptions squandered the potential 
value of a truly uniform MTA. Nonetheless, as discussed further below, 
the UBMTA seems to have served as the template for a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) between WiCell and PHS. This MOU paved the 
way for both effective use of a government license to WARF’s stem cell 
patents underlying WiCell’s IPR position and reasonable access to WiCell 
stem cell lines in the federally funded research community.54 
III. THE CURRENT WICELL CONTROLLED STEM CELL 
RESEARCH LICENSING REGIME 
The story behind WARF’s and WiCell’s current control of the stem 
cell research environment provides an excellent case study in the power of 
MTAs to control life sciences research. In 1998, Dr. James A. Thomson at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison (“Wisconsin”) achieved an amazing 
breakthrough in stem cell research when he cultured immortal human em-
bryonic stem cells (hESCs).55 While he had earlier cultured an immortal 
line of primate embryonic stem cells,56 creating the human cell line was 
his ultimate objective. As Thomson continued his pioneering research in 
this area, WARF, as the external technology transfer office (TTO) of Wis-
                                                                                                                         
 50. See AUTM, Resources: Signatories to the March 8, 1995 Master UBMTA 
Agreement, http://www.autm.net/aboutTT/aboutTT_umbtaSigs.cfm (last visited Aug. 30, 
2006). 
 51. See UMBTA, supra note 2, at 12771. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id.  
 54. See infra Part III. 
 55. See James A. Thomson et al., Embryonic Stem Cells Derived from Human Blas-
tocysts, 282 SCI. 1145, 1145-47 (1998); Gretchen Vogel, Breakthrough of the Year: Cap-
turing the Promise of Youth, 286 SCI. 2238 (1999). 
 56. See U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 (filed Jan. 18, 1996). 
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consin, worked to secure patent protection for the subject matter of his in-
vention disclosures. Equally important, WARF also sought to protect and 
exploit the actual hESC lines as physical property using the lease-license 
model described above.57 In fact, WARF quite effectively used the two 
strands of rights in a lease-license model—physical property and IPR—to 
reinforce each other and give WARF, through WiCell, its dominant posi-
tion in the stem cell research environment. Presumably under a version of 
the common university faculty policy that requires assignment of patents 
and physical materials arising from university-based research, Thomson 
assigned WARF his rights in both a sequence of patents covering stem 
cells (“WARF/Thomson Patents”) and in physical property rights to the 
hESC lines themselves.58 
The crux of his first and second patented inventions was the ability to 
create stable, embryonic stem cell lines that could continually and indefi-
nitely generate new embryonic stem cells. The cells would not begin dif-
ferentiation into particularized cells for specific tissues of the adult organ-
ism, nor would the cells undergo significant genetic mutations. The claims 
of the patents are directed both to stem cells as compositions of matter and 
to the process for creating cultures of such stem cells. The first patent, 
U.S. Patent No. 5,843,780 issued in 1998 (“the ’780 Patent”), was directed 
to primate embryonic stem cells.59 
                                                                                                                         
 57. See supra Part II. 
 58. See id.; U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (filed June 26, 1998); U.S. Patent No. 
7,005,252 (filed Mar. 9, 2000); WiCell MOU, supra note 4. 
 59. Because the exact claims of the patent are critical for those who seek to under-
stand its scope and validity, I reproduce them here in toto: 
We claim:  
 1. A purified preparation of primate embryonic stem cells which (i) 
is capable of proliferation in an in vitro culture for over one year, (ii) 
maintains a karyotype in which all the chromosomes characteristic of 
the primate species are present and not noticeably altered through pro-
longed culture, (iii) maintains the potential to differentiate into deriva-
tives of endoderm, mesoderm, and ectoderm tissues throughout the cul-
ture, and (iv) will not differentiate when cultured on a fibroblast feeder 
layer. 
 2. The preparation of claim 1 wherein the stem cells will spontane-
ously differentiate to trophoblast and produce chorionic gonadotropin 
when cultured to high density. 
 3. A purified preparation of primate embryonic stem cells wherein 
the cells are negative for the SSEA-1 marker, positive for the SSEA-3 
marker, positive for the SSEA-4 marker, express alkaline phosphatase 
activity, are pluripotent, and have karyotypes which includes the pres-
ence of all of the chromosomes characteristic of the primate species and 
in which none of the chromosomes are noticeably altered. 
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The upshot of the research resulting in the ’780 Patent was that Thom-
son and Wisconsin were now able to produce relatively large quantities of 
stable primate embryonic stem cells. Researchers could then perform ex-
periments on those cells, directing them to differentiate into specific tis-
sues in a controlled manner. Thomson’s breakthrough, therefore, achieved 
the critical first step on the path to the holy grail of stem cell research: to 
be able to generate any tissue of the body at will to replace diseased or de-
stroyed tissue in specific patients. Ideally, researchers would create such 
tissues from stem cells whose genetic materials were identical to, or de-
rived from, the patient’s own genome. This genetic matching would 
minimize the risk that the patient’s immune system would recognize the 
new tissue as dangerous foreign cells and destroy them.60 
                                                                                                                         
 4. The preparation of claim 3 wherein the cells are positive for the 
TRA-1-60, and TRA-1-81 markers. 
 5. The preparation of claim 3 wherein the cells continue to prolif-
erate in an undifferentiated state after continuous culture for at least one 
year. 
 6. The preparation of claim 3 wherein the cells will differentiate to 
trophoblast when cultured beyond confluence and will produce chori-
onic gonadotropin. 
 7. The preparation of claim 3 wherein the cells remain euploid for 
more than one year of continuous culture. 
 8. The preparation of claim 3 wherein the cells differentiate into 
cells derived from mesoderm, endoderm and ectoderm germ layers 
when the cells are injected into a SCID mouse. 
 9. A method of isolating a primate embryonic stem cell line, com-
prising the steps of: 
 (a) isolating a primate blastocyst; 
 (b) isolating cells from the inner cell mass of the blastocyst of (a); 
 (c) plating the inner cell mass cells on embryonic fibroblasts, 
wherein inner cell mass-derived cells masses are formed; 
 (d) dissociating the mass into dissociated cells; 
 (e) replacing the dissociated cells on embryonic feeder cells; 
 (f) selecting colonies with compact morphologies and cells with 
high nucleus to cytoplasm ratios and prominent nucleoli; and 
 (g) culturing the cells of the selected colonies. 
 10. A method as claimed in claim 9 further comprising maintaining 
the isolated cells on a fibroblast feeder layer to prevent differentiation. 
 11. A cell line developed by the method of step 9. 
’780 Patent. 
 60. This patient customization step is the province of so-called therapeutic cloning 
research that seeks to predictably generate stable blastocysts using somatic cell nuclear 
transfer processes to combine a specific patient’s genetic materials with a donor egg. The 
blastocysts can then be used to obtain embryonic stem cells containing the patient’s ge-
netic material, and thus to generate differentiated tissues/cells to replace the patient’s 
diseased or destroyed tissues without triggering a dangerous immune response.  
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It remains to be seen whether the ’780 Patent directed to “primate em-
bryonic stem cells” covers hESCs as well. At one level it should, because 
humans are primates. But, if so, why did WARF pursue the next patent in 
its stem cell patents sequence—U.S. Patent No. 6,200,806 (“the ’806 Pat-
ent”), issued on March 13, 2001—with essentially identical claims to the 
’780 Patent, but instead directed to “pluripotent human embryonic stem 
cells”?61 In fact, the ’806 Patent even uses the same title—“Primate Em-
bryonic Stem Cells”—as the ’780 Patent. Further, nearly all of the back-
ground descriptive material in the ’806 Patent is the same as that in the 
’780 Patent. 
Two arguments suggest that the ’780 Patent may not cover hESCs. 
First, while the “Summary of Invention” and “Description of the Inven-
tion” sections of the ’780 Patent do not determine the scope of the patent’s 
claims, they do indicate that a significant part of the invention’s utility 
comes from allowing researchers to “generat[e] transgenic non-human 
primates for models of specific human genetic diseases.”62 It is standard 
practice to use animal experiments to explore possible outcomes of treat-
ment regimens in humans by analogy. Thus, WARF may have been con-
cerned that courts would interpret the ’780 Patent to cover only non-
human primate embryonic stem cells because the patent never mentions 
any activities directly involving hESCs. Second, WARF may have worried 
that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) stated policy of not 
issuing patents on humans63 could lead courts to interpret the ’780 Patent 
as covering only non-human primate embryonic stem cells. As just noted, 
the proposed utility of the invention in the ’780 Patent appears to be that 
researchers could use the patented stem cells to create actual transgenic 
primates with certain desirable disease traits. This use may have cut too 
close to a patent on humans if a court interpreted the scope of the claims to 
cover hESCs.  
While these concerns reach the same outcome—omission of hESCs 
from the interpretation of the scope of the claims—the two issues are quite 
different. The first simply interprets the claims to omit hESCs because 
they do not appear to be included, regardless of whether hESCs are pro-
hibited subject matter in the utility application of the patent, under law or 
USPTO policy. Thus, this interpretation is based on a scenario where a 
court would deem that WARF did not intend to include hESCs in the pat-
ent claims. The second interprets the claims to omit hESCs—even if the 
                                                                                                                         
 61. ’806 Patent at col. 21. 
 62. ’780 Patent at col. 6. 
 63. 1077 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 24 
(1987). 
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court would find that WARF did intend to include them—because such 
inclusion would be void as illegal or against USPTO policy. The court’s 
only other option, in this second scenario, would be to invalidate any pat-
ent claims that appear to include hESCs in the problematic utility applica-
tion of experimental transgenic primates (assuming these claims are found 
to represent a prohibited patent on humans). 
The ’806 Patent may remedy these potential shortcomings in several 
ways. First, the patent changes the title of the invention description section 
from “Description of the Invention” to “Detailed Description of the Pre-
ferred Embodiments.” As well, the patent slightly modifies the text to 
make it clear that the utility of creating diseased transgenic primates is 
limited to the two “preferred embodiments,” or best mode, of the embry-
onic stem cell lines described for common marmoset and rhesus monkeys 
respectively. Further, the ’806 Patent attempts to quell any concerns over 
whether the demonstrated science at the time of the original patent appli-
cation64 allowed claims specifically for hESC lines, even though no line 
fitting the parameters of the claims appears to have existed when the ap-
plication was filed. The patent relies on scientific arguments based on 
drawing analogies between (1) the actual research done on embryonic 
stem cells in both common marmosets and rhesus monkeys and (2) the 
postulated ability to reach the same outcomes with hESCs.65 
                                                                                                                         
 64. See infra note 65. 
 65. In particular, the argument is stated in the following excerpt from the patent: 
 There are approximately 200 primate species in the world. The 
most fundamental division that divides higher primates is between Old 
World and New World species. The evolutionary distance between the 
rhesus monkey and the common marmoset is far greater than the evolu-
tionary distance between humans and rhesus monkeys. Because it is 
here demonstrated that it is possible to isolate ES cell lines from a rep-
resentative species of both the Old World and New World group using 
similar conditions, the techniques described below may be used suc-
cessfully in deriving ES cell lines in other higher primates as well. 
Given the close distance between rhesus macaques and humans, and the 
fact that feeder-dependent human EC cell lines can be grown in condi-
tions similar to those that support primate ES cell lines, the same 
growth conditions will allow the isolation and growth of human ES 
cells. In addition, human ES cell lines will be permanent cell lines that 
will also be distinguished from all other permanent human cell lines by 
their normal karyotype and the expression of the same combination of 
cell surface markers (alkaline phosphotase, preferably SSEA-3, SSEA-
4, TRA-1-60 and TRA-1-81) that characterize other primate ES cell 
lines. A normal karyotype and the expression of this combination of 
cell surface markers will be defining properties of true human ES cell 
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Even though some or all of the foregoing reasoning explains WARF’s 
motives in filing for the ’806 Patent, it does not explain why the USPTO 
allowed two heavily overlapping patents to issue. Either it is an accidental 
incidence of double patenting, which could raise validity questions for the 
patents, or the USPTO believed that the claims of the ’780 Patent did not 
extend to hESCs even though humans would normally be considered a 
species in the genus of primates. If the latter interpretation is correct, there 
are strong ramifications for the scope of the federal government’s rights 
and license to the WARF hESC technology. As indicated in the ’780 Pat-
ent, the Thomson research leading to the claimed invention in that patent 
was at least partially funded by an NIH grant.66 This means that the inven-
tion falls under the provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (“Bayh-
Dole”),67 which provides the government with some rights in the technol-
ogy. First, Bayh-Dole gives a mandatory non-exclusive license granted 
back to the government.68 Second, the Act enables the government, upon 
certain triggering events, to exercise march-in rights which allow it to 
grant licenses under the patent to third parties against the wishes of the 
patent owner (essentially a kind of compulsory license).69 The ’806 Patent 
                                                                                                                         
lines, regardless of the method used for their isolation and regardless of 
their tissue of origin.  
’806 Patent at col. 6-7. What is curious about this approach for the ’806 Patent is that 
Thomson formally announced that he had actually created a hESC line in a November 
1998 publication in Science. See Thomson, supra note 55, at 1145-47. The timing of this 
article presumably means that he had the line in his possession earlier than the publica-
tion date. Yet the application for the ’806 Patent—as a division of the earlier 1995 appli-
cation and continuation-in-part of the 1996 application as discussed below—was not filed 
until June 26, 1998. Why, then, was there no mention of Thomson’s ability to actually 
culture the hESC line covered in the patent? Instead, the patent relies on the scientific 
analogy argument reproduced above. There is, of course, a prohibition in patent law on 
introducing new subject matter into an application after the filing date that one is tracing 
priority back to—and WARF may well have wanted to get the 1995 or 1996 parent appli-
cation dates for priority with regard to the ’806 Patent—but mention of the actual hESC 
line would not have been introducing new subject matter. Rather, it would have been 
simply showing further refinement of the existing subject matter. Perhaps the timing was 
not connected and WARF filed the application for the ’806 Patent without realizing that 
Thomson was just about to successfully create the hESC line. Ultimately, an examination 
of the prosecution history of both the ’780 Patent and the ’806 Patent might yield some 
answers to all of these questions. Other practitioners and scholars are indeed already ana-
lyzing the WARF stem cell patents for infirmities or limitations. See, e.g., Kenneth S. 
Taymor, Christopher Thomas Scott & Henry T. Greely, The Paths Around Stem Cell In-
tellectual Property, 24 NATURE BIOTECH. 411 (2006). 
 66. ’780 Patent at col. 1. 
 67. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2000). 
 68. Id. § 202(c)(4). 
 69. Id. § 203. 
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and the most recently issued patent in WARF’s stem cell patent sequence, 
U.S. Patent No. 7,005,252 (“the ’252 Patent”) issued on February 28, 
2006, either leave the required “Statement Regarding Federally Funded 
Research” section of the patents blank or list “not applicable.” Accord-
ingly, WARF must be claiming that no federal funds were used in the re-
search leading to the patents and the government licenses and rights under 
Bayh-Dole therefore do not exist for these patents. In the case of the ’252 
Patent, claiming the absence of federal funding is plausible because the 
patent issued directly from an application filed on March 9, 2000, and the 
scope of the claims and invention is clearly different from that of the ’780 
Patent and the ’806 Patent, even though the newest patent still deals with 
hESC subject matter. But the ’806 Patent issued as both a continuation-in-
part (CIP) of the same parent application, U.S. Patent Application Serial 
No. 08/376,327 filed on January 20, 1995 and now abandoned (“the ’327 
Application”), that led to the ’780 Patent (also as a CIP) and as a division 
of an application filed on January 18, 1996. So, even if the 1996 applica-
tion introduced material outside of the scope of the ’327 Application, there 
is still common subject matter arising from the ’327 Application. Further, 
because the description of the invention, including the research relied on 
to justify the patentability of the inventions, is essentially the same in both 
patents, it is hard to believe that the NIH grant covered research only lead-
ing to one and not the other. It is difficult to imagine what research was 
not relied on in the ’806 Patent but was still used in the ’780 Patent. 
This hair-splitting analysis is not merely academic: as mentioned 
above, the question of whether federal funding was used to invent the sub-
ject matter covered by specific patents directly determines whether the 
government has the licenses and rights mandated under Bayh-Dole. To 
some extent, the concerns raised here are moot because of the arrangement 
that PHS has worked out with WARF and WiCell, as discussed below. 
Yet, these concerns are still relevant as a practical matter because WARF 
and WiCell appear to have been playing hardball, even within the context 
of the PHS arrangement. Further, a failure by WARF to duly record gov-
ernment rights in the ’806 Patent could open the patent up to challenges by 
either the government or infringement defendants in any suits brought by 
WARF to enforce the patent.  
The federal funding analysis is also quite important to Geron Corpora-
tion (“Geron”), which also funded much of Thomson’s research at Wis-
consin and took a license from WARF to any patents that might issue un-
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der the ’327 Application (“the 1996 Geron License”).70 This initial license 
was styled as a “Standard Non-exclusive License Agreement” by the par-
ties.71 It stipulated that the license granted was non-exclusive in the Li-
cense section of the agreement.72 In actuality, though, Geron was also 
granted a renewable one-year period of exclusivity for the Licensed Pat-
ents73 (defined as the ’327 Application, any foreign equivalents, CIPs until 
January 1, 1998, and continuations and reexaminations).74 In addition, 
Geron was granted an option to obtain “non-exclusive licenses” to any fur-
ther inventions developed by Thomson by January 1, 1998.75 Neverthe-
less, if Geron did exercise this option, then any new patents licensed under 
the option would be added to the definition of “Licensed Patents” and 
would thus presumably be subject to the period of exclusivity so long as 
Geron continued to renew it.76 The 1996 Geron License also contemplates 
that federal funding may have been involved in Thomson’s research lead-
ing to the ’327 Application, which would mean that Geron’s exclusivity 
under the agreement would be limited by U.S. Government rights under 
Bayh-Dole.77 Accordingly, the 1996 Geron License carves out a limitation 
to allow for these potential government rights and licenses.78 However, the 
relevant clause also states that, “In the event there is assertion by the Gov-
ernment of such rights, Geron may be entitled to modification of the roy-
alty and license fee provisions of the Agreement.”79 Thus, the answer to 
the question of whether federal funding was involved in the research lead-
ing to the ’327 Application and in any follow-on applications would have 
significant impact on WARF and Geron’s license arrangement. Unfortu-
nately, I am unable to determine the scope of the only-federal funding ex-
plicitly tied to any of Thomson’s hESC work during this period—NIH 
NCRR Grant No. RR00167—because I have not been able to obtain a 
copy.80 Thus, we can only be certain that federal funding was used some-
where during the research that led to the ’780 Patent. As discussed above, 
                                                                                                                         
 70. See Geron Corp., Standard Nonexclusive License Agreement (Agreement No. 
95-0208) (Form S-1), at Ex. 10.11 (June 12, 1996) [hereinafter 1996 Geron License]. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. § 2(A). 
 73. Id. § 2(C). 
 74. Id. at app., item A. 
 75. Id. § 2(D). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-11 (2000). 
 78. See 1996 Geron License, supra note 70. 
 79. Id. 
 80. I could not find the grant in any of the publicly accessible databases where other 
NIH grants are posted. 
2006] USE OF MTAS TO CONTROL COMMERCIALIZATION 1035 
because the ’327 Application is the only application that led to the ’780 
Patent other than the CIP application for the ’780 Patent itself, which 
seemed to add no new subject matter to that introduced by the ’327 Appli-
cation, one could infer that the NIH grant covered the research that led to 
the ’327 Application. If this is the case, though, as discussed above Bayh-
Dole should subject the ’806 Patent to U.S. Government rights because it 
is derived in part from the ’327 Application. In fact, because Geron’s li-
censes and options covered patents issuing from the ’327 Application, if 
the NIH grant covered the research leading to the ’327 Application, Bayh-
Dole would subject all of the patents that Geron had some claim to under 
the agreement to U.S. Government rights. 
Although it is somewhat suspicious that the 1996 Geron License in-
cludes a nominally non-exclusive license coupled with a “period of exclu-
sivity,” it is not necessarily nefarious. There may have been good reasons 
for not granting an exclusive license outright—from satisfying Bayh-
Dole’s own stated preference for non-exclusive licenses for federally 
funded patents to the parties’ legitimate desire to reach an agreement that 
would lower Geron’s license costs. In support of the latter, consider that 
an outright exclusive license normally fetches higher upfront license fees 
and royalty rates than a non-exclusive license. Accordingly, Geron and 
WARF may have reached a compromise wherein Geron was granted a less 
expensive non-exclusive license coupled with an option for exclusivity. 
Presumably, Geron would have paid some additional amount for this op-
tion, but the overall price tag on the deal may have still been lower than if 
Geron sought an exclusive license. This kind of compromise arrangement, 
if true, is simply good, creative license negotiations.81 Keep in mind that at 
the time of this original license, there was no issued patent on Thomson’s 
research and he had not yet successfully cultured the hESC line. At that 
stage, WARF could only offer a license to a patent application on what I 
often call “cool science:” research results that are of significant interest to 
the research community and science buffs, but that are nowhere near a 
commercialized product. The technology transfer license game often in-
volves this kind of angling by outside companies. They want to get in 
early enough on emerging research that leverage in the license negotiation 
rests more with the company than with the TTO, but not so early that the 
company bleeds itself dry with payments to TTOs and universities for cool 
science that is too far away from commercialization to satisfy investors. 
                                                                                                                         
 81. Anecdotally, I have heard that technology transfer licenses—and IP licenses 
generally—are increasingly using options to brook disagreements in potential license 
terms that threaten to scuttle the deal entirely. I think this is a desirable development. 
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Overall, given the record available, I think both parties played their re-
spective hands well. 
Although Geron received a number of favorable provisions in the 1996 
Geron License, one provision is quite unfavorable—the inclusion of the 
January 1, 1998, date for emergent CIPs on the ’327 Application as part of 
the definition of Licensed Patents. Geron and WARF agreed to amend-
ments of this agreement in March 1997 and March 1998. I have been un-
able to track down the text of these amendments because Geron has not 
included them in their required Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) filings (despite having included the redacted text of the original li-
cense in its initial public offering (IPO) filing with the SEC). One can 
therefore infer that the amendments were not particularly important.82 As-
suming the definition of Licensed Patents remained the same through 
January 1998, the ’806 Patent, containing possibly the only claims cover-
ing hESCs, would not qualify as a Licensed Patent because it was filed as 
a CIP on the ’327 Application on June 26, 1998. Tough luck for Geron, if 
true.83  
It is likely that Geron found itself without exclusivity to the ’806 Pat-
ent, as a new license was negotiated and executed between WARF and 
Geron in May 1999, effective as of April 23, 1999 (“the 1999 Geron Li-
cense”).84 In the alternative, Geron could have desired to flip the agree-
ment into an outright exclusive license arrangement based upon the twin 
                                                                                                                         
 82. I am unaware of any publicly available sources for the licenses between Geron 
and WARF other than Geron’s required filings with the SEC for both its IPO, under the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000), and as a reporting company, as 
defined under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2000). 
However, these requirements mandate only certain initial and periodic disclosures, in-
cluding agreements or contracts that are “material” to the reporting company. Geron must 
have considered the 1996 Geron License material because it included the agreement as an 
exhibit to its Form S-1, filed on June 12, 1996, as part of its IPO. However, Geron must 
not have considered the 1997 and 1998 amendments to the 1996 Geron License material, 
even though they were mentioned in a subsequent 1999 license that supersedes the 1996 
Geron License (included as a material agreement in a later SEC filing), because these 
amendments were not themselves included in any of Geron’s SEC filings. Significant 
amendments to a material contract would seem to me to be material, themselves. Thus, 
assuming that Geron did not violate any securities laws through its selective disclosure of 
these agreements and amendments, the contents of these amendments presumably were 
not significant enough to be deemed material. 
 83. One could speculate as to filing date decisions by WARF, but, again I have 
found no evidence of underhanded activities by either WARF or Geron in any of the stem 
cell patents issues, despite the apparent unpopularity of WARF in this matter. 
 84. Geron Corp., License Agreement (Form 10-Q), at Ex. 10.1 (Nov. 15, 1999) 
[hereinafter 1999 Geron License]. 
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events of issuance of the ’780 Patent and announcement of Thomson’s 
creation of a viable hESC line in 1998. In any event, the 1999 Geron Li-
cense is indeed a straightforward exclusive license agreement for both 
“Therapeutic Products”85 and “Diagnostic Products”86 worldwide.87 The 
“Licensed Patents” in the agreement expressly include the ’780 Patent, 
and, presumably, the application for the ’806 Patent.88 The 1999 Geron 
License also provides a worldwide exclusive license to the Licensed Pat-
ents for “Research Products,”89 which are essentially research tools.90 
These two exclusive license grants are limited to the “Licensed Field,” 
which includes only “(i) Research Products, (ii) Therapeutic Products and 
(iii) Diagnostic Products developed from and/or incorporating the Materi-
als as precursors to [certain enumerated cell types] as well as [the same 
                                                                                                                         
 85. Defined as: 
products or services other than Diagnostic Products that (i) are used in 
the treatment of disease in humans, and (ii) employ, are in any way 
produced by the practice of, are identified or arise out of any research 
involving the inventions claimed in the Licensed Patents or that would 
otherwise constitute infringement of any claims on the Licensed Pat-
ents. 
Id. at app. A, item C.  
 86. Defined as: 
products or services that (i) are used in the diagnosis, prognosis, screen-
ing or detection of disease in humans, and (ii) employ, are in any way 
produced by the practice of, are identified using or arise out of any re-
search involving the inventions claimed in the Licensed Patents or that 
would otherwise constitute infringement of any claims of the Licensed 
Patents. 
Id. at app. A, item D. 
 87. Id. § 2(A)(i). 
 88. Id. at app. A, item A; Id. at app. B (listing the ’780 Patent but also including two 
other patent applications, titled “Primate Embryonic Stem Cells” and “Primate Embry-
onic Stem Cells With [. . .] Genes” (bracketed material in title redacted by Geron in the 
SEC filing) respectively, but whose application numbers and other identifying informa-
tion have been redacted by Geron in the SEC filing). 
 89. Defined as:  
products or services that (i) are used in research as research tools which 
would infringe the claims of patented technology owned by Geron or 
which Geron has a right or license to use other than the Licensed Pat-
ents, and (ii) which employ, are in any way produced by the practice of, 
are identified using or arise out of any research involving the inventions 
claimed in the Licensed Patents or that would otherwise constitute in-
fringement of any claims of the Licensed Patents. Research Products 
specifically excludes the Materials.  
Id. at app. A, item E. Materials are defined as “the primate, including human, embryonic 
stem cells claimed in the Licensed Patents.” Id. at app. A, item H. 
 90. Id. § 2(A)(ii). 
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enumerated cell types].”91 Materials are defined as “the primate, including 
human, embryonic stem cells claimed in the Licensed Patents.”92 Finally, 
the 1999 Geron License also provides a worldwide non-exclusive license 
to the Licensed Patents for Geron to use in its internal research pro-
grams.93 
There is no doubt about it—this is a strong license for Geron. In es-
sence, it allows the company to lock down the entire worldwide commer-
cialization of stem cell therapies and diagnostics,94 with the latter only 
limited to cell types enumerated in the agreement. Even the cell type limi-
tation for diagnostics is not as strict as it sounds, because Geron also has a 
first option to negotiate exclusive licenses to new cell types that it identi-
fies. Furthermore, if the parties cannot negotiate the new exclusive license, 
then WARF may not offer a license to those new cell types to any other 
party on terms more favorable than those offered to Geron in the option 
exercise negotiation.95 As a final extra kicker, Geron has a right to subli-
cense its licenses under the agreement.96 
WARF has achieved a good deal as well. It has had the opportunity to 
evaluate Geron as a commercializing entity for WARF’s patents since 
1996 and, presumably, has been pleased with Geron’s progress.97 TTOs 
                                                                                                                         
 91. Id. at app. A, item I. The bracketed material was redacted by Geron in the SEC 
filing. An interesting postscript in the scope of the license grant occurred in 2001. WARF 
apparently came under public pressure to increase access to its patented stem cell tech-
nologies and sued Geron to recover some of the exclusive rights granted to Geron. Anto-
nio Regalado & David P. Hamilton, How a University’s Patents May Limit Stem-Cell 
Research, WALL ST. J., July 18, 2006, at B1, B5. The parties settled the lawsuit out of 
court by limiting Geron’s exclusive rights to nerve, heart, and pancreatic cells. Id. 
 92. 1999 Geron License, supra note 84, at app. A, item H. 
 93. Id. § 2(A)(iii). 
 94. It allows this to the extent that the ’780 Patent and ’806 Patent continue to be 
interpreted as covering all current possible hESCs and their production and that foreign 
patent filings by WARF are successful. 
 95. Id. § 2(C). 
 96. Id. § 2(B). 
 97. Indeed, Geron recently made three announcements. First, it has data supporting 
important progress in its first-in-class hESC therapies. See Press Release, Geron Corp., 
Geron Presents New Data that Document Progress in Development of Therapeutic Prod-
ucts from Human Embryonic Stem Cells (July 5, 2006), available at http://www.geron.-
com/pressview.asp?id=765. Second, it published preclinical data showing the safety and 
utility (efficacy) of its hESC therapy for spinal cord injury. See Press Release, Geron 
Corp., Geron Announces Publication of Study Results Supporting Safety and Utility of 
Human Embryonic Stem Cell-Derived Therapeutic Product for Treatment of Spinal Cord 
Injury (July 19, 2006), available at http://www.geron.com/pressview.asp?id=769. Third, 
it commenced preclinical safety and efficacy studies for three cell types derived from 
hESCs (hepatocytes, osteoblasts, and chrondocytes) for the treatment of liver failure and 
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are required to place two bets when considering commercializing faculty 
research: first, that the research, and its related technology, will ultimately 
result in successful products in the marketplace; and second, that the out-
side organization the TTO selects to undertake the commercialization 
process as licensee of the technology will successfully execute a good 
commercialization plan. This process resembles weighing the relative im-
portance of the technology versus the management team in a startup com-
pany. Anecdotally, in the venture capital (VC) community, VCs would 
rather fund a good, experienced management team with mediocre technol-
ogy than a good technology with a mediocre management team.98 WARF 
also obtained a grant-back non-exclusive license to any enhancement or 
improvement patents Geron develops under the agreement.99 Yet, it is the 
compensation provisions of the 1999 Geron License that really shine for 
WARF. The provisions continue the arrangement from the 1996 Geron 
License wherein Geron reimbursed portions of WARF’s costs for prose-
cuting the patents both domestically and abroad.100 As well, WARF se-
cured presumably decent royalty rates, including minimum annual royal-
ties and milestone payments.101 Finally, WARF negotiated for generous 
upfront payments from Geron. These payments initially comprised a com-
bination of cash, 100,000 stock options to Geron stock, and 20,000 shares 
of Geron common stock.102 
The value of the equity portion of the upfront payment became much 
easier to calculate when the parties amended the agreement in October 
1999 to flip the stock option portion of the equity payment into actual 
shares of Geron common stock.103 The net result was a flat upfront equity 
payment of 92,000 shares of Geron common stock, most critically with a 
specific requirement that Geron file a registration statement with the SEC 
by October 8, 1999, to register such shares for unrestricted public trad-
                                                                                                                         
musculoskeletal disorders including osteoarthritis, bone fractures, and osteoporosis. See 
Press Release, Geron Corp., University of Edinburgh Form Collaboration for Develop-
ment of Three Cell Types Derived From Human Embryonic Stem Cells (Aug. 7, 2006), 
available at http://www.geron.com/pressview.asp?id=773. 
 98. This may be because of the other conventional wisdom in the high tech commu-
nity that the best technology in an emerging market/industry does not always win out in 
the race for public acceptance and market share. 
 99. 1999 Geron License, supra note 84, § 2(D). 
 100. Id. § 4(C). 
 101. Id. § 4(D)-(E). The actual royalty rates, minimum annual royalty payments, and 
milestone payments have been redacted from Geron’s SEC filing. 
 102. Id. § 4(A). The cash payment amount has been redacted from Geron’s SEC fil-
ing. 
 103. Geron Corp., Amendment to License Agreement (Form 10-Q), at § 1 (Nov. 15, 
1999). 
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ing.104 On the date that this amendment became effective, Geron’s com-
mon stock was trading on Nasdaq at around $10 per share, thus the value 
of the equity payment to WARF was approximately $920,000. Not bad, 
especially considering that there was a cash upfront payment as well. Ad-
ditionally, in early 2000, Geron’s common stock peaked at nearly $80 per 
share, making WARF’s stake worth approximately $7.3M, assuming that 
WARF had not already sold part of it.105 
Those people who are unhappy with Geron’s exclusive license can 
take some comfort in the fact that the 1999 Geron License includes termi-
nation provisions tied to the usual triggers, such as failure to meet mile-
stones specified in the agreement or make royalty and other contractual 
payments.106 Further, and most relevant for the discussion below, the 
agreement also contains the government rights clause included in the 1996 
Geron License, outlined above.107 Thus, to the extent that any of the Li-
censed Patents arose from federally funded research—as did the ’780 Pat-
ent and arguably the ’806 Patent as well—the U.S. Government has a non-
exclusive license to practice those patents for government purposes. Tech-
nically, this means that Geron cannot have an exclusive license to any 
such patents, despite the exclusive grant language in the 1999 Geron Li-
cense. Of course this is a standard issue in technology transfer licenses, 
especially in the life sciences, where Bayh-Dole covers many university 
patents because of the extent of federal funding of university life sciences 
research. So, few sophisticated licensees will feel duped by having exe-
cuted an agreement specifying an exclusive license, only to have the grant 
cut back later in the document by a clause noting the possibility of a gov-
ernment non-exclusive license. Nonetheless, the possibility of a govern-
ment non-exclusive license does impact the value of the otherwise truly 
exclusive license to the licensee. For this reason, the 1999 Geron License, 
like the 1996 Geron License, reduces royalty rates and license fees in the 
event that the government asserts a license.108 
                                                                                                                         
 104. Under federal securities laws, unregistered shares are not freely tradable on na-
tional stock exchanges. This limits the liquidity of such shares, and hence also reduces 
their value because resale of the shares involves a more cumbersome process than work-
ing through a broker-dealer affiliated with a national stock exchange such as the New 
York Stock Exchange. 
 105. At the close of business on Tuesday, Aug. 22, 2006, Geron’s common stock 
traded at $6.21 per share (Nasdaq trading symbol: GERN). Hopefully WARF has already 
diversified its portfolio by selling off some of the Geron shares at an earlier date (and 
higher value). 
 106. 1999 Geron License, supra note 84, § 7. 
 107. Id. § 14. 
 108. Id. 
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This time period must have been quite busy for stem cell related pro-
jects at WARF. As it was prosecuting the ’806 Patent with the USPTO and 
negotiating with Geron to amend the 1999 Geron License, it was also cre-
ating WiCell as a not-for-profit, wholly owned subsidiary for further re-
search, training, and distribution of the newly cultivated Thomson hESC 
lines.109 WiCell claims it was necessary to move hESC research off-
campus while it sorted through the ethical, legal, and social implications 
of the “federal funding prohibition,”110 likely referring to the NIH morato-
rium on funding hESC research.111 Ironically, the moratorium itself seems 
to have been put in place largely as a response to Thomson’s cultivation 
of the hESC line.112 I have heard that WARF’s and Wisconsin’s interest in 
moving the research off campus was actually to keep new inventions from 
falling under Bayh-Dole. The truth is likely somewhere in between: faced 
with the sudden prospect of greatly diminished funding for hESC research 
while NIH sorted things out, Wisconsin and WARF may have intended to 
keep new hESC completely outside of federal funding in order to avoid 
government claims to new inventions under Bayh-Dole. The amount of 
new federal funding for the research would not justify giving up those 
rights. However, the argument that Wisconsin and WARF wanted to keep 
cultivation of actual hESC lines outside of federal funding to cut off gov-
ernment rights is off-key in one specific regard: Bayh-Dole only governs 
patents that arise under federally funded research—not physical property, 
or even, for that matter, other forms of IP such as copyrights or trade se-
crets.113 
Regardless of WARF’s true motivations for the creation of WiCell, the 
net result was that WiCell now controlled the valuable Thomson hESC 
line for distribution under MTAs. Further, WiCell held a sub-licensable 
license from WARF for the Thomson stem cell patents and presumably for 
any relevant new patents or applications arising from Thomson’s ongoing 
work. Though WiCell’s stated mandate is to “share widely” the Thomson 
                                                                                                                         
 109. PowerPoint Presentation, WiCell Research Institute, Inc., Special Cells Create 
Special Opportunities and Special Problems (on file with author) [hereinafter WiCell 
PowerPoint]. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Sean M. O’Connor, Intellectual Property Rights and Stem Cell Research: 
Who Owns the Medical Breakthroughs?, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 665, 671 (2005). 
 112. See id. at 670-71. 
 113. Although, even where a federal funding recipient deems some new proprietary 
item or process a trade secret, it may still fall under government rights if it is nonetheless 
patentable subject matter and hence a subject invention under Bayh-Dole. In other words, 
the federal funding recipient cannot elect to protect something as a trade secret just to 
evade U.S. government rights in a patentable invention. 
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hESCs,114 commentators assert that WiCell has failed to do this.115 In 
WiCell’s defense, the 1999 Geron License restricts what third party activi-
ties WARF, and therefore WiCell, can license or sublicense. Yet, if a par-
ticular third party activity cannot be licensed or sublicensed appropriately 
without violating the terms of the 1999 Geron License, WiCell likely can-
not deliver Thomson hESCs to that third party. Even if its license from 
WARF permitted this, the transfer would be of little use to the recipient if 
it could not legally use the cells without infringing WARF’s patents.116 
Outside of the 1999 Geron License (which does not specify that Geron 
use Thomson cultured hESCs) and the PHS funded researchers operating 
under the WiCell-PHS MOU,117 WARF and WiCell appear to have under-
taken a lease-license model for distributing the Thomson hESC technol-
ogy platform to industry researchers.118 In other words, the only available 
license to the Thomson patents for industry researchers is a combination 
license and MTA which, while permitting the licensee to obtain some 
hESCs from third party suppliers, contemplates that the licensee will also 
receive hESCs from WiCell.119 At the same time, no hESCs have been dis-
tributed by WiCell without a sublicense to the patents.120 In the early days 
following Thomson’s announcement of the cultivation of his hESC line, 
the conditions for WARF’s mutually reinforcing physical property and IP 
rights were pretty good: no one else was publicly in possession of such a 
cell line, generating substantial leverage for WARF and WiCell. Further in 
their favor, the ’780 Patent arguably covered hESCs, and the hESC-
specific ’806 Patent was already being prosecuted. 
Nonetheless, in 2001, WiCell’s position of leverage received a tre-
mendous boost from two sources. First, although NIH resolved its con-
cerns about hESC research and issued hESC research guidelines and so-
licitation of funding proposals in 2000, President Bush announced on Au-
                                                                                                                         
 114. WiCell PowerPoint, supra note 109. 
 115. See, e.g., Taymor, Scott & Greely, supra note 65. 
 116. Still, many suspect that university researchers are in fact routinely infringing 
third party patents in their research based either on ignorance of the patents or misguided 
belief that the patents simply do not apply to them legally or morally. See generally View 
from the Bench, supra note 1; Walsh, Roadblocks, supra note 1. 
 117. See text accompanying notes 135-46. 
 118. See WiCell Research Institute, Inc., Form of Industry Research License and Ma-
terial Transfer Agreement (on file with author). 
 119. See 1999 Geron License, supra note 84. 
 120. Some concrete evidence of this exists in the 1999 Geron License where WARF 
permits Geron to sublicense the patents only to collaborators in Geron’s internal research 
program that do not require hESCs. If the collaborator does require them, they must come 
from WARF under a negotiated MTA. Id. § 2(A)(iii). 
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gust 9, 2001, that no federal funding would go to any researchers working 
with hESCs derived from cell lines created after that date.121 Somewhere 
between Thomson’s 1998 announcement of what was supposed to be the 
first immortal hESC line and August 2001, a number of new hESC lines 
had apparently been created. There were so many, in fact, that President 
Bush claimed there would be plenty of sources of hESCs for federally 
funded researchers to work from even while complying with his order.122 
One wonders whether anyone licensed these lines under the ’780 Patent, 
or whether, again, WARF believed that the ’780 Patent covered only non-
human primate embryonic stem cells and not hESCs. At any rate, the 
number of viable hESC lines quickly dropped in the months after the Bush 
Order, and the NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry (“the Regis-
try”) ultimately listed only twenty-two approved hESC lines.123 Many of 
the original estimated sixty hESC lines at the time of the Bush Order ei-
ther turned out not to exist, failed to continue producing new cells, failed 
to remain stable in an undifferentiated state, or were tainted by non-human 
cultures or feeder cells intended to sustain them.124 Further, even among 
the twenty-two hESC lines finally certified in the Registry, many are 
owned by a single entity, meaning that only seven distinct organizations 
control all of the approved lines. One of these entities—MizMedi Hospital 
in South Korea—is currently “on hold” in the wake of the stem cell crisis 
in that country.125 Thus, currently there are only six sources of viable, ap-
proved hESCs in the world, with only three—WiCell, BresaGen in Geor-
gia, and University of California, San Francisco—based in the United 
States.126 Clearly, this dramatically increases the value of WiCell’s lines. 
The second major event for WARF and WiCell in 2001 was the March 
13 issuance of the ’806 Patent, unmistakably directed to hESCs. At that 
point, regardless of the interpretation of the scope of the ’780 Patent’s 
claims, WARF had established clear patent control over hESCs, which has 
                                                                                                                         
 121. See O’Connor, supra note 111, at 671-73. 
 122. See id. at 672. The Administration estimated that sixty hESC lines were avail-
able at the time of the Order. Id. 
 123. See id. at 689. 
 124. See, e.g., Press Release, Salk Inst. for Biological Studies, Press Releases: Cur-
rent Human Embryonic Stem Cell Lines Contaminated with Potentially Dangerous Non-
Human Molecule, UCSD/Salk Team Finds, Jan. 24, 2005, available at http://www.-
salk.edu/news/releases/details.php?id=115 [hereinafter Stem Cell Lines Contaminated]. 
 125. See Nat’l Insts. of Health, NIH Human Embryonic Stem Cell Registry, http://-
stemcells.nih.gov/research/registry (last visited Aug. 30, 2006) [hereinafter NIH Regis-
try]. 
 126. Id. 
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yet to be openly challenged.127 Even providers other than WiCell of Regis-
try-approved hESC lines are likely subject to WARF’s patent rights. 
Those researchers who use hESCs from other sources need a license from 
WARF or WiCell.  
With these two developments in 2001, WARF and WiCell solidified 
their position as the dominant force in hESC research, owing much of 
their success to their highly effective lease-license model. It is hard to 
overestimate the strength of WARF’s and WiCell’s position in the field—
a realization that has slowly been dawning on many players in the field, 
including the forces behind Proposition 71 and the California Institute of 
Regenerative Medicine (CIRM). Unless someone finds a way to success-
fully challenge or design around the ’780 Patent and the ’804 Patent, 
WARF and WiCell own the field. Further, even if someone finds a way 
around the patents, unless a future President rescinds the Bush Order, or a 
subsequent Congress passes legislation that will not be vetoed by the 
President in office at that time,128 researchers are still stuck with seven or 
fewer suppliers of hESCs approved for federally funded research.129 This 
realization has led to state, federal, and local funding initiatives.130 At any 
rate, the current hESC environment provides an excellent case study in the 
stickiness of effective technology lease-license models based on mutually 
reinforcing physical property and IP rights. It reveals that finding a way 
around one set of rights simply drives the researcher headlong into the 
other set of rights. Accordingly, a researcher must work around both sets 
of rights, which is a far more difficult challenge than evading only one set. 
Yet, all is not lost for the non-commercial hESC researcher who wants to 
work with hESCs without signing an agreement (at least directly) with 
WARF/WiCell. As evidenced by the government rights listed in the ’780 
Patent and potentially included in the ’806 Patent, outlined above, the 
                                                                                                                         
 127. The Wall Street Journal, however, reported that the Foundation for Taxpayer 
and Consumer Rights, based in Santa Monica, California, has petitioned the USPTO to 
reexamine the WARF/Thomson Patents. See Regalado & Hamilton, supra note 91, at B1, 
B5. Even so, there is no indication of this on the Foundation’s stem cell project web 
pages. See The Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights, Stem Cell Research: Who 
Will Benefit?, http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/healthcare/StemCell (last visited Aug. 
24, 2006). 
 128. After the current Congress’ inability to override President Bush’s veto of the 
Stem Cell Enhancement Act, H.R. 810, 109th Cong. (2006), it is unlikely that any new 
law will be enacted to effectively override the Bush Order with President Bush still in 
office. 
 129. Even these approved lines may in fact be contaminated and unusable for human 
therapeutics. See Stem Cell Lines Contaminated, supra note 124. 
 130. See O’Connor, supra note 111, at 674-81. 
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critical right mandated under Bayh-Dole is the non-exclusive license back 
to the government required in funding agreements.131 I cannot stress 
enough that what I will call the 202(c)(4) license (after its section in the 
U.S. Code) is completely different from the march-in rights that the fund-
ing agency can exercise only if the funding recipient has failed to com-
mercialize the patent or otherwise triggered one of the specific bases for 
march-in rights.132 March-in rights are a bit of a red herring. Although 
they have received the lion’s share of media attention as the key govern-
ment right to federally funded patented inventions, the government has yet 
to exercise them, and has only contemplated doing so a handful of 
times.133 On the other hand, the 202(c)(4) license requires no triggering 
event to become effective. Every federal funding agreement executed after 
Bayh-Dole took effect must include a provision giving the government a 
non-transferable non-exclusive license. Thus, the government already has 
a non-exclusive license to a patent as soon as it arises from federally 
funded research.134 This is effectively no different from the licenses and 
options that Geron received as part of its funding of Thomson’s research. 
In the Thomson case, so long as the federal funding was obtained under a 
funding agreement executed after Bayh-Dole, the 202(c)(4) license must 
have been included as part of that agreement. As a result, the government 
may practice, or have practiced on its behalf, for government purposes, 
any patented technologies arising from that federal funding.135 
Although it is still unclear when the funding agreement was executed, 
and whether the federal funding covered the research leading to the ’806 
Patent, WARF, WiCell, and PHS136 appear to agree that the 202(c)(4) li-
                                                                                                                         
 131. 35 U.S.C. § 202(c)(4) (2000). 
 132. See 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2000). 
 133. See O’Connor, supra note 111, at 700-07. 
 134. See Sean M. O’Connor, Presentation at Madrid CSIC/OECD/OEPM Conference 
on Research Use of Patented Inventions: Public-Private Partnerships and De Facto Re-
search Use Exemptions: Case Study of the Thomson Stem Cell Patents (May 18-19, 
2006), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/25/36817472.pdf. 
 135. Note that even though Bayh-Dole was passed in 1980, much research leading to 
currently patented inventions was funded before Bayh-Dole’s passage. Even though 
many federal funding agreements before Bayh-Dole contained the non-exclusive license 
grant back to the government, not all did. See O’Connor, supra note 111, at 681-87. 
Thus, evidence of federal funding for, and thus government rights in, any particular pat-
ent must be examined to determine exactly when the funding agreement was executed 
and whether it contained a license clause if executed before Bayh-Dole’s passage in 
1980. This issue has arisen in the recent high-profile litigation involving John Madey and 
Duke University. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 136. PHS is the parent agency of NIH, which funded the research noted in at least the 
’780 Patent. 
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cense is in place for both the ’780 and ’806 Patents. Effective September 
5, 2001—thus after both the Bush Order and the issuance of the ’806 Pat-
ent—WiCell and PHS entered into a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU). This MOU confirmed PHS’s non-exclusive license to the ’780 
Patent and ’806 Patent, as well as to the patent application that led to the 
’252 Patent (deemed the “Wisconsin Patent Rights”).137 Furthermore, the 
MOU stipulated that PHS has no ownership rights in the actual hESC lines 
(deemed the “Wisconsin Materials”).138 
The WiCell-PHS MOU is fascinating because it undertakes to clearly 
authorize PHS contractors, who are none other than regular PHS extramu-
ral researchers at universities and other research institutions, to practice 
the WARF/Thomson Patents directly under PHS’s license rights. At the 
same time, it can be confusing that the WiCell-PHS MOU does not spe-
cifically use the term “license” nor reference the 202(c)(4) license by 
name. One scholar at the “California’s Stem Cell Initiative” Conference at 
Boalt Hall responded to a question about what led to the execution of the 
WiCell-PHS MOU by explaining that PHS pressured WiCell into giving a 
license to the WARF/Thomson Patents under threat of march-in rights. 
Yet, nothing in the record indicates that such pressure existed.139 More-
over, there is no mention of a license in the subsequent conditions, except 
                                                                                                                         
 137. See WiCell MOU, supra note 4. The application for the ’252 Patent was U.S. 
Patent Application No. 09/522,030 (filed March 9, 2000). 
 138. See id. at recital cl. 5. 
 139. Further, there was no justification for why march-in rights could have been ex-
ercised in 2001 when the WiCell-PHS MOU was executed. A threat of march-in rights by 
a federal agency is not really credible unless the funding recipient has failed to take rea-
sonable steps to commercialize the invention or otherwise triggered one of the specific 
bases for march-in rights. Ultimately, if WiCell was bullied into giving a license that did 
not already exist, why is there no license grant in the WiCell-PHS MOU? The relevant 
language simply states that “The Parties agree that Wisconsin Patent Rights are to be 
made available without cost for use in the PHS biomedical research program subject to 
the following conditions . . .” See WiCell MOU, supra note 4, § 1. Finally, the recitals to 
the WiCell-PHS MOU explain that “W[hereas] PHS funded primate research studies at 
the University of Wisconsin-Madison that led to certain discoveries claimed in Wisconsin 
Patent Rights. . .[,] the Government has certain use and other rights to the intellectual 
property comprising the Wisconsin Patent Rights granted by law and regulation . . . ” Id. 
at recital cl. 4. This clearly indicates that the parties agreed that PHS’ funding was condi-
tioned on a license back to the government of any patents arising under that funding (“the 
Government has certain use and other rights to the intellectual property”), exactly as oc-
curs with the 202(c)(4) license. If the rights contemplated in this recital were march-in 
rights, the language would have had to either include mention of a completed march-in 
rights proceeding (which has most certainly not occurred with regard to the 
WARF/Thomson Patents), or that government IP use rights would be contingent upon the 
successful exercise of march-in rights after a formal proceeding. 
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for a license granted to third party suppliers of hESCs solely for providing 
the hESCs to PHS researchers.140 This confirms that no new license was 
needed, because the 202(c)(4) license was already in place. The third party 
license grant in the MOU also confirms that once the ’806 Patent issued, 
all of the third party approved hESC providers were arguably infringing 
WARF’s patents. 
Under the terms of the WiCell-PHS MOU, a PHS researcher need only 
submit a completed version of the “Sample Simple Letter Agreement for 
the Transfer of Materials to PHS Scientists and PHS Contractors” (“the 
Simple Letter Agreement”) that was included as part of the WiCell-PHS 
MOU.141 The Simple Letter Agreement is a basic form of standard life sci-
ences MTA. In combination, the master WiCell-PHS MOU document and 
the Simple Letter Agreement for recording specific transfers of materials 
are similar to the Master UBMTA and its Implementing Letter form, de-
scribed above in Part I. No license grant is included in the Simple Letter 
Agreement. This further reinforces the conclusion that PHS and WiCell 
must be operating under the 202(c)(4) license, as no other license has been 
explicitly granted or would have arisen by operation of law or regulation. 
Finally, the WiCell-PHS MOU underscores the lease-license model 
used by WiCell. It clearly states in the master document and the Simple 
Letter Agreement that “Wisconsin Materials are the property of WiCell 
and are being made available to investigators in the PHS research commu-
nity as a service by WiCell.” The document also clarifies that 
“[o]wnership of Wisconsin Materials shall remain with WiCell.”142 Fi-
nally, the MOU includes further restrictions on the use of Wisconsin Ma-
terials, in part to reinforce WARF’s exclusive IP license to the therapeutic 
and diagnostic fields (by prohibiting PHS contractors from using Wiscon-
sin Materials in these fields and limiting all uses to teaching and non-
commercial research purposes), and in part to provide the liability limiting 
function discussed in Part I above.143 
In the end, the WiCell-PHS MOU is perhaps most intriguing because it 
clearly demonstrates that a government agency can make good use of the 
often-overlooked 202(c)(4) license. This is especially important in the 
                                                                                                                         
 140. Id. § 1(c). 
 141. Id. at 8-9. 
 142. Id. § 2(a). It is unclear whether the inclusion of the term “service” is meant in 
the sense we used it above—e.g., personal or professional services—or whether it is used 
in the sense of a public benefit or moral duty. If the former, WiCell is claiming a service-
license model that has even more implications for the legal rights of PHS and its re-
searchers as set forth in Part II. See supra Part II. 
 143. WiCell MOU, supra note 4, § 2. 
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hESC context because it shows that there are effective counterbalancing 
government rights that give researchers access to federally funded inven-
tions even where patents and exclusive licenses otherwise have locked 
down the field. Indeed, outside of this PHS research license bubble or 
zone, WiCell and WARF are widely believed to have been very tight with 
granting licenses, even for research purposes. Of course, the Bush Order 
itself limits this PHS research bubble/zone. At the same time, though, 
WiCell has made it clear that it intends to make its hESCs and appropriate 
sublicenses to the WARF/Thomson Patents widely available to non-
commercial researchers outside of the PHS research bubble/zone through 
an MOU and Simple Letter Agreement format similar to the WiCell-PHS 
MOU arrangement.144 Moreover, it has a separate MTA for industry re-
search, which it claims to be willing to use in “nearly all fields.”145 Need-
less to say, the terms of the 1999 Geron License must limit this aspect of 
its program. Nonetheless, WiCell successfully bid to become the host for 
the National Stem Cell Bank established by NIH.146 It thus committed to 
attempt to collect all twenty-two approved stem cell lines and make them 
available to all researchers for $500 per line, apparently including a li-
cense to the WARF/Thomson Patents.147 
IV. WHERE DOES CIRM FUNDED RESEARCH FIT IN? 
One of the most unhappy places in the country with regard to WiCell’s 
domination of the hESC terrain is California, and particularly, CIRM. In 
2004, the Bush Order of 2001 appeared to be the primary obstacle for 
California’s strong hESC research community.148 In order to sidestep the 
federal funding restrictions, Californians sought to finance research them-
selves through Proposition 71.149 It turned out, though, that the 
WARF/Thomson Patents—already issued before Proposition 71 appeared 
on the ballot—were the real problem. California and the new CIRM were 
unprepared for this. Further, because Proposition 71 and CIRM were in-
                                                                                                                         
 144. WiCell Research Institute, Inc., FAQs About WiCell’s Policies on the Use of its 
hESC Lines, http://www.wicell.org/uploads/media/NIH_FAQs.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 
2006) [hereinafter WiCell hESC Lines]. 
 145. See WiCell PowerPoint, supra note 109; WiCell hESC Lines, supra note 144. 
 146. See WiCell hESC Lines, supra note 144. 
 147. See id. WiCell makes it clear that hESCs obtained from other providers may 
require a separate license to the WARF/Thomson Patents, leading one to infer that such a 
license is included when one obtains the hESCs from WiCell. See id. Again, it is not clear 
how this squares with the 1999 Geron License or with the strong sentiment in the hESC 
research community that WiCell is holding up research by being stingy with licenses. 
 148. See O’Connor, supra note 111 at 675-79. 
 149. See id. 
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tended to fund exactly the kinds of research that would not be funded by 
NIH under the Bush Order, CIRM was and is still boxed out of co-funding 
research with NIH that would bring California CIRM funded researchers 
within the PHS research license zone, outlined at the end of Part II above. 
While Proposition 71 does not prohibit such co-funding situations, it steers 
CIRM grants towards hESC research that would not otherwise receive 
timely funding.150 
CIRM now faces two basic avenues of pursuit. First, it can fund re-
searchers to work “earlier” in, or alternatively to, the current chain of 
hESC research in order to avoid infringing the WARF/Thomson Patents, 
while at the same time designing around those patents to create pluripotent 
human stem cell lines that do not infringe the patent. Second, it can help 
researchers pursue a de facto research-use exemption, possibly available to 
states and their agencies under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Along 
the former avenue, Kenneth Taymor, Christopher Thomas Scott, and 
Henry Greely of the Stanford University Program on Stem Cells in Soci-
ety discuss some promising approaches in a recent article in Nature Bio-
technology.151 Along the latter avenue, I will be examining this mecha-
nism more completely in a future article, and so I will only briefly de-
scribe it here. 
Beginning from the premise that CIRM is truly a state agency, rather 
than an independent legal entity, CIRM can arguably practice patents 
without the owner’s authorization under the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity. This works because under federal law prospective plaintiffs cannot 
use the federal courts to sue individual states.152 At the same time, patent 
infringement suits are limited to federal courts because they arise under 
federal law.153 Therefore, patent owners cannot sue states for infringe-
ment. While this doctrine has been upheld by the Supreme Court,154 it has 
prompted some unsuccessful bills in Congress. Thus, to the extent that a 
state and/or its agencies begin relying on this doctrine as a routine matter, 
we could expect to see attempts at Congressional legislation overriding 
this doctrine. Nevertheless, because it is rooted in constitutional law, the 
courts can overturn any such legislation as unconstitutional. The more 
practical question is whether a state or its agencies could immunize con-
tractors under this doctrine by arguing that the contractors have been au-
                                                                                                                         
 150. See id. at 675. 
 151. Taymor, Scott & Greely, supra note 65. 
 152. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 635, 647 (1999). 
 153. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000). 
 154. See Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635, 647. 
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thorized to produce certain goods or services on behalf of the state gov-
ernment or agency. If so, CIRM would be able to authorize grant recipi-
ents to perform their work on behalf of the State of California. This would 
be similar to the way PHS authorizes extramural researchers performing 
hESC research under PHS grants to act on behalf of PHS, thus bringing 
them directly under the 202(c)(4) government license. 
If CIRM cannot successfully pursue any of these avenues, it will be 
stuck with whatever license terms it can negotiate with WARF and/or 
WiCell, at least until the patent terms run out for the ’780 Patent and ’806 
Patent. WiCell’s license terms for non-commercial research are not that 
onerous. In fact, because WiCell won the grant to host the first NIH Na-
tional Stem Cell Bank, it is now obligated to make at least the hESC lines 
even more readily available. Currently, it will provide hESC lines to any 
researcher engaged in non-commercial research at a U.S. academic institu-
tion or not-for-profit research organization for $500 whether or not that 
researcher is working under an NIH grant.155 However, WiCell is reported 
to have told CIRM that it considers CIRM’s plans to take 25% of the 
revenue from patenting discoveries made by CIRM-funded entities as a 
commercial use of the WARF/Thomson Patents, entitling WARF and 
WiCell to “a cut of [CIRM’s] take.”156 CIRM has responded that such a 
claim is “unprecedented,” though the parties appear to remain at an im-
passe.157 WiCell’s argument may be a non-starter at any rate; directed to 
CIRM itself, it could only be enforced through a patent infringement ac-
tion from which CIRM, as a California State agency, would receive im-
munity under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Further, CIRM’s prac-
tice of funding research and receiving a return on that funding investment 
would in no way constitute the making, using, selling, or importing of the 
WARF/Thomson Patents or any products embodying those patents. Thus, 
there would be no patent infringement by CIRM. Alternatively, if WiCell 
sought to impute the potentially patent infringing activities of CIRM fund-
ing recipients to CIRM, CIRM again could authorize its funding recipients 
to perform their research on behalf of CIRM as state contractors—but 
then, such contractors are likely equally immune under sovereign immu-
nity as agents of the state. 
                                                                                                                         
 155. See WiCell Research Institute, Inc., National Stem Cell Bank, available at 
http://www.wicell.org/index.php?option=com_oscommerce&Itemid=192 (last visited 
Aug. 30, 2006); WiCell Research Institute, Inc., FAQs for Requesting Stem Cells, 
http://www.wicell.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=124&Ite
mid=197 (last visited Aug. 20, 2006). 
 156. See Regalado & Hamilton, supra note 91, at B1, B5. 
 157. Id. 
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Finally, if it is really a commercialization license issue that creates 
hurdles to CIRM’s plans, based on WiCell’s own linkage of the commer-
cialization license with the path to clinical trials, I would suggest the unor-
thodox and potentially risky strategy of using the non-commercial licenses 
as far as they will go and then relying on the Supreme Court’s recent 
broad interpretation of the Hatch-Waxman regulatory review research-use 
exemption under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) in Merck v. Integra.158 This would 
allow researchers to seamlessly move from easy-to-obtain non-
commercial licenses to a full blown commercialization research and de-
velopment (“R&D”) phase without having to negotiate with WARF or 
WiCell for the more challenging commercialization licenses. This strategy 
is viable because the non-commercial license explicitly allows licensees to 
patent any new inventions that come out of the non-commercial research 
performed under the license. Yet, once the beginnings of a promising new 
therapeutic, diagnostic, or research tool arose in the non-commercial set-
ting, the academic or not-for-profit research institution would then be able 
to patent the new invention and license it out to industry to commercialize. 
The licensee could then commence the translational R&D phase to trans-
form the early stage patented invention into a potential therapeutic, diag-
nostic, or research tool product. Simultaneously, the licensee could begin 
preliminary toxicology screenings in animals, dosing experiments, or any 
of the other activities that the Supreme Court has identified as “on the path 
to” FDA approval, and hence covered by the 271(e) regulatory review re-
search use exemption.159 While many view the Supreme Court’s interpre-
tation of the scope of the 271(e) exemption as far too broad, it currently 
                                                                                                                         
 158. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).  
 159. See id. at __; see also Sean M. O’Connor, Summary: Merck KGaA v. Integra 
Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. __ (2005), 12 CASRIP NEWSLETTER (2005), available at 
http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/Vol12/newsv12i1US1.html. Argua-
bly, WARF could respond by first attempting to distinguish the commercializing entity’s 
uses of the WARF/Thomson Patents that fall within one of the activities listed by the 
Supreme Court as nearing FDA approval and then claiming infringement—and damages 
or injunctive relief—on all the rest of the uses. However, I think this would be a messy 
proposition, and courts might find the different uses inseparable or simply covered under 
the 271(e) regulatory review research use exemption. If the uncertainty is high enough, it 
could cause WARF to reconsider whether to bring such a suit in the first place, especially 
considering that a patent infringement lawsuit would open the WARF/Thomson Patents 
to validity challenges by the defense. The best outcome would be that WARF revisits its 
commercialization license policy and finds a way to be as reasonable as possible, without 
violating its agreements with Geron. That way, it could license the patents to the potential 
infringers, thereby reinforcing the presumed validity of those patents and receiving a ne-
gotiated enforceable royalty stream from whatever stem cell products finally reach the 
marketplace. 
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appears to be the law of the land. CIRM and the California stem cell re-
search and commercialization industry should use this fact to their advan-
tage. Such high profile use of the strategy proposed herein may push Con-
gress to amend 271(e), assuming that enough members of Congress be-
lieve that the Supreme Court interpreted the current language of 271(e) too 
broadly. Until Congress does so, though, the strategy proposed herein 
maps a perfectly legal path around the allegedly onerous and largely un-
available WiCell commercialization licenses.160 
V. CONCLUSION: LOOKING BEYOND THE THOMSON 
PATENTS 
I am confident that CIRM will find a path around the obstacles sur-
rounding the WARF/Thomson Patents. As argued above, though, patents 
do not necessarily pose the greatest hurdles to research over time. Physical 
property rights, as controlled and enforced through MTAs, are often the 
most difficult to overcome. As discussed above, primarily state contract 
law governs MTAs and other mechanisms for controlling or enforcing 
physical property rights. In the case of human biological materials, states 
have established constitutional, statutory, and/or case law that may limit 
the downstream use of materials, depending on the type of informed con-
sent or other permission given by the original donor. 
The absence to date of any significant donor issues in the approved 
hESC lines should not make us complacent.161 With only twenty-two lines 
total, all developed by only seven research organizations, we may not have 
the kind of volume and long term experience with hESC lines necessary 
for donor issues to emerge. As CIRM continues to promulgate rules and 
regulations for hESC research programs in California, it would do well to 
consider planning for and implementing a comprehensive chain-of-title 
type of system for biological materials from donation through inclusion in 
commercialized products. With materials passing through many different 
organizations, this is undoubtedly an incredibly attenuated chain, but it 
reflects the nature of MTAs. Allowing different parties with very different 
goals to control the materials at different times creates a substantial risk 
that a downstream party will use the materials in a manner inconsistent 
                                                                                                                         
 160. Of course, if the numerous interpretations of the Merck Court’s holding finding 
a broad reading of 271(e) are incorrect, then the strategy proposed herein may be vulner-
able to legal challenges in court. 
 161. Only one donor seems to have exercised any rights that would effectively retract 
an approved hESC line. See NIH Registry, supra note 125 (noting that the Sahlgrenska 3 
cell line formerly offered by Cellartis AB has been withdrawn by its donor). 
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with the donor’s consent. This will hold especially true if and when the 
patent obstacles are overcome, which would trigger a race to obtain large 
quantities of donor materials, such as oocytes. 
Other presenters and articles in the “California’s Stem Cell Initiative” 
Conference have greater expertise in the legal and ethical issues involved 
in informed consent, so I will not attempt to recapitulate those issues here. 
Instead, I will conclude by focusing on the consent issue most directly 
linked with commercialization: the consent form’s statement of proposed 
use of materials. For example, Advanced Cell Therapies (ACT) has al-
ready begun actively soliciting donors to supply oocytes. It uses an in-
formed consent form that includes an explicit waiver of any donor rights 
in commercial benefits arising from research.162 The form focuses, though, 
on the use of the materials for scientific research as opposed to the even-
tual product R&D that leads to a saleable product. Further, many human 
biological materials are collected in university or non-profit settings that 
align with the public’s general sense of what constitutes scientific re-
search—that is, relatively impartial, objective research into natural princi-
ples and mechanisms with no direct profit motive. Prospective donors 
might feel quite differently about giving biological materials to a for-profit 
entity that expressly plans to use the materials for profitable products or 
services. Still, is the disclosure of potential commercialization in the con-
text of a waiver of donor rights in commercial benefits enough to trigger a 
meaningful understanding in donors that their materials can be transferred 
to a for-profit corporation for commercialization? In other words, the 
standard informed consent forms may play on the public’s general unfa-
miliarity with how the chain of commercialization works. Put yet another 
way, will women being asked to donate oocytes, an unpleasant and risky 
procedure, be more inclined to do so when they are told the eggs will be 
used for potentially life-saving medical research than if they are told the 
eggs will be used to develop profitable products for a private corporation? 
I do not intend to denigrate the role that for-profit entities play in the 
commercialization chain. Rather, I wish to ensure that all entities in the 
commercialization chain—non-profit and for-profit alike—accurately 
manage expectations. 
Therefore, I propose that CIRM establish a system to monitor, guide, 
and control the entire commercialization rights chain. The first stage 
would consist of consent forms and other documentation for the original 
oocyte donation to research units. The second stage would be MTAs and 
                                                                                                                         
 162. Advanced Cell Therapies, Form of Consent to Participate in a Study Involving 
Egg Donation for Stem Cell Research, at 6 (on file with author). 
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other documentation used to transfer the materials, or their derivatives, to 
applied or translational R&D units. The third and final stage would be 
MTAs and other documentation used to transfer the materials to manufac-
turing, distribution, and sales units, as applicable. This list is not meant to 
be exclusive—other transfers may be required for specific commercializa-
tion efforts. It is, however, a proposal for a comprehensive title chain for 
the materials. Admittedly, this new layer of monitoring could devolve into 
a clunky bureaucracy that slows down or even sometimes prevents the 
timely collection and transfer of valuable biological materials. However, 
given modern inventory tracking systems and CIRM’s willingness to fo-
cus on implementing an effective system, the biological materials title 
chain should not slow down the research or commercialization processes. 
In fact, an efficient tracking system could very well speed up research and 
commercialization by allowing faster location and routing of needed mate-
rials.  
The biological materials title chain will not perform its desired func-
tion unless donors receive realistic and accurate disclosures in their in-
formed consent forms. While I do not advocate unnecessarily scaring off 
donors, we generally go too far in suggesting an overly-romantic view of 
donations to medical science for the benefit of humanity. At one level, this 
depiction may well be true. Yet at another, it may seem manipulative to 
donors who do not realize that their biological materials will wind up in 
the hands of a for-profit corporation intending to make a fair bit of profit 
off of the materials, albeit in a highly derivate form. In sum, donors re-
quire more disclosure about the commercialization process for hESC 
therapies, diagnostics, and research tools. Through disclosure, we will 
avoid problematic backlashes by donors who are willing to undergo pain 
and inconvenience so long as it is for a cause they understand and support. 
